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Ethnicity in the 1940 Presidential
Election in Iowa: A Quantitative Approach
Thomas G. Ryan
ALTHOUGH HE WON AN UNPRECEDENTED THIRD TERM IN THE
1940 presidential election. Franklin D. Roosevelt ran well be-
hind his landslide 1936 vote, prompting questions of who
voted for Roosevelt in 1936 but not in 1940, and why did the
Roosevelt vote fall so sharply between the two elections? '
Previous studies of the 1940 election cite German-Ameri-
cans as the principal agents in the decreased Democratic
presidential vote, arguing that German-Americans voted con-
siderably less strongly for Roosevelt in 1940 than in 1936 be-
cause of his anti-German, pro-English foreign policy. ^  Inter-
pretations of 1940 voting behavior which emphasize the roles
of ethnicity and of foreign policy considerations in that elec-
tion also list Italian-Americans, Irish-Americans, and Roman
Catholics in general as other important participants in the
movement away from Roosevelt in 1940.'
'Roosevelt's share of the total popular vote fell from 60.8% in 1936 to 54.7% in 1940, while
his electoral vote decreased from 523 to 449, as he carried forty-six states in 1936 and forty in
1940. Svend Petersen, A Statistical History of the American Presidential Elections (New York,
1963), 94-98.
'Among the works which emphasize the role of German-Americans in decreasing the
Democratic presidential vote in 1940 are Samuel Lubell, The Future of American Politics (3d
ed., rev.. New York, 1965), 131-155; James MacGregor Burns, Roosevelt: The Lion and the Fox
(New York, 1956), 455; Robert A. Divine, Foreign Policy and U.S. Presidential Elections. 1940-
1948 (New York, 1974) 86; Ellsworth Barnard, Wendell Willkie: Fighter for Freedom (Mar-
quette, 1966), 265; Robert W. Chemy, "Isolationist Voting in 1940: A Statistical Analysis,"
Nebraska History, 52 (Fall 1971), 293-309; and Howard W. Allen, "Isolationism and Germaa-
l^mmcin^," Journal of the Illinois State Historical Society, LVII (Summer 1964), 143-149.
'Samuel Lubell, Revolt of the Moderates (New York, 1956), 80; Harold F. Gosnell, Cham-
pion Campaigner: Franklin D. Roosevelt (New York, 1952), 187; Warren Moscow, Roosevelt
and Willkie (Englewood Cliffs, 1968), 197.
A useful definition of "ethnic group" is: "A collectivity within a larger society having real or
putative common ancestry, memories of a shared historical past and a cultural focus on one or
more symbolic elements defined as the epitome of its peoplehood." R. A. Schermerhorn, Com-
parative Ethnic Relations: A Framework for Theory and Research (New York, 1970), 12-17,
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While most attempts to explain changes in voting behavior
between 1936 and 1940 emphasize ethnicity and foreign policy
as the chief factors in the decreased Democratic presidential
vote, some accounts of the election find the sources of the in-
creased Republican vote in the defection of middle western
farmers and of upper-income citizens, both of whom are
alleged to have deserted Roosevelt in large numbers between
1936 and 1940." However, the few studies which do find eco-
nomic explanations for some of the decrease in the Demo-
cratic presidential vote also list German-Americans as an im-
portant element in the Willkie coalition, thereby merging
ethnic-foreign policy and economic-domestic policy considera-
tions.
Despite the widespread agreement among historians that
members of specific nationality and religious groups con-
tributed disproportionately to the increased Republican presi-
dential vote in 1940, little systematic analysis of demographic
or of voting data has been presented to support such conten-
tions. Although the voters rendered the verdict in the Roose-
velt-Willkie contest, as in other presidential elections, they are
almost invisible in accounts of the 1940 election.
This study of the 1936-1940 voting behavior' of specific
groups in Iowa attempts to ". . . use . . . local history to test
traditional assumptions and large generalizations," * about the
roles of nationality, religion, and size of community in the
third Roosevelt election. The evidence confirms traditional
assumptions regarding the large-scale defection of German-
quoted in John L. Shover, "Ethnicity and Religion in Philadelphia Politics, 1924-1940," Ameri-
can Quarterly. XXV (December 1973), 500-501. At least one authority suggests that "Every
American, as we shall use the term, is a member or potential member of an ethnic group—racial,
religious, or national origin." Charles H. Anderson, White Protestant Americans: From Na-
tional Origins to Religious Group (Englewood Cliffs, 1970), xiii.
*Gosnell, Champion Campaigner, 187; "Gallup and Fortune Polls," Public Opinion Quar-
terly. 5 (March 1941), 147; Robert E. Burke, "Election of 1940," History of American Presi-
dential Elections. 1789-1968. ed. Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., IV (New York, 1971), 2946.
'Throughout this paper, the phrase "1936-1940 voting behavior" refers to the amount of
change in the Democratic percentage of the presidential vote between 1936 and 1940.
'Michael Kämmen, "Politics. Science, and Society in Colonial America: An Essay Review
of Recent Approaches and Neglected Opportunities,"/ourna/o/5ocia/ííijíoo'. 3 (Fall 1969),
78.
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Americans from Roosevelt. It offers little support, however,
for interpretations such as those of Robert E. Burke or Mal-
colm Moos, which attribute Democratic losses to farmers, or
for the interpretations of Harold F. Gosnell or of Warren
Moscow,'which emphasize the defection of Roman Catholics
from the Roosevelt coalition.
Statewide there was a decline of 6.8% in the vote for
Roosevelt between the 1936 and 1940 elections. Changes in
Roosevelt's share of the vote ranged from an increase of 0.9%
(in Webster County) to a decrease of 23.1% (in Bremer
County). The wide range suggests that voters in this seemingly
homogeneous state responded in varied ways to the 1940 polit-
ical situation.' Table I indicates the number of counties in
which Roosevelt's share of the vote increased or decreased
specific amounts between 1936 and 1940. Although his vote
decreased in ninety-eight of the ninety-nine counties, the size
of the decrease varied considerably from county to county.
Several factors infiuenced this range in the 1936-1940 vot-
ing behavior of Iowa counties. One thing is clear: counties
with large numbers of first- and second-generation German-
Americans recorded greater declines in the vote for Roosevelt
in 1940 than did counties with smaller proportions of first-
and second-generation German-Americans. The relationship
between the size of the German-American population in each
county and the size of the decrease in the Democratic presi-
dential vote was not linear, but, as Table II shows, the larger
Some recent studies of nineteenth century voting behavior suggest that investigations of
popular voting can be combined with studies of political elites to enlarge our understanding of
the American political experience. Among the best known recent works are Lee Benson, The
Concept of Jacksonian Democracy: New York as a Test Case (Princeton, 1961); Richard J. Jen-
sen, The Winning of the Midwest: Social and Political Conflict. 1888-1896 (Chicago, 1971);
Paul Kleppner, The Cross of Culture: A Social Analysis of Midwestern Politics. 1850-1900 (New
York, 1970); and Samuel T. McSeveney, The Politics of Depression: Political Behavior in the
Northeast. 1893-1896 (New York, 1972).
'"Election of 1940," 2946; The Republicans: A History of Their Party (New York, 1956),
418-419; Champion Campaigner. 187; Roosevelt and Willkie. 197.
'Unless indicated otherwise, all changes in voting behavior are based on the total, rather
than the two-party, vote. Arnold Rogow, "The Loyalty Oath Issue in Iowa, 1951," American
Political Science Review. LV (December 1961), 869, notes that "Political, economic, and social
homogeneity have been more characteristic of Iowa than of a large number of other states." In
addition, Iowa has few non-whites and few immigrants from southern or eastern Europe.
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TABLE I
Number of Iowa Counties in which the Democratic Presidential Vote In-
creased/Decreased Specific Amounts, 1936-1940^
Change in Democratic
Presidential Vote
Increased 0.1- 4.9% 1 county (N = l)*
Decreased 0.1 - 4.9% 32 counties {N = 32)
Decreased 5.0- 9.9% 39 counties (N = 39)
Decreased 10.0 - 14.9% 17 counties (N=17)
Decreased 15.0 - 19.9% 8 counties (N = 8)
Decreased 20.0 - 24.9% 2 counties (N = 2)
»State of Iowa, Official Register, 1937-1938 (Des Moines, n.d.), 312-313.
Official Register. 1941-1942 (n.d.), 652-653.
*In all subsequent tables, the symbol N= indicates the number of counties
or cities in each category.
the German foreign stock population in each group of
counties, the larger the decrease in the Democratic percentage
of the presidential vote. In the thirty-nine counties where first-
and second-generation German-Americans were less than
8.0% of the total population, Roosevelt's presidential vote de-
creased only 4.4%. This was less than one-third the decrease
in the most German counties in the state. In the nine counties
where first- and second-generation Germans were 24.0-31.9%
of the total population, Roosevelt's vote declined 16.0%.
There is considerably less evidence to show that the presi-
dent lost Iowa because of an agrarian revolt.' While Iowa
farmers decreased their Democratic presidential vote some-
what more than other Iowans, 11.3% compared with a state-
wide decrease of 6.8%, the uneven incidence of Roosevelt's
farm losses suggests that factors other than specifically
agrarian discontent explain the pattern of Democratic de-
creases in the Iowa farm vote. '" Table III indicates the wide
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TABLE II
Decrease in the Democratic Percentage of the Presidential Vote by Iowa
Counties, 1936-1940, by German Foreign Stock Percentage of the Total Pop-
ulation, 1930*»*
German Foreign Stock Average Decrease
in Democratic
Presidential Vote
0 - 7.9% 4.4% (N=39)
8.0 - 15.9% 7.2% (N=30)
16.0 - 23.9% 10.3% (N=21)
24.0-31.9% 16.0% (N=9)
'^United States Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Fif-
teenth Census of the United States: 1930 Population, Volume III, Part I
(Washington, 1932), 785-788. Official Register. 1937-1938. 312-313, 1941-
1942. 652-653.
•Because the 1940 census listed the country of birth only for the foreign-
born white in each Iowa county, the 1930 census was used to establish the
German foreign stock in each county because it listed both the country of
birth of the foreign born and the country of birth of the foreign-born parents
of the native born of foreign or mixed parentage.
range in the 1936-1940 voting behavior of Iowa farmers, as
those living in Linn County decreased their vote for Roosevelt
only 1.1%, while Plymouth County farmers voted 32.3%
less Democratic in 1940 than in 1936. In addition to Linn
County, farmers in seventeen other counties decreased their
Democratic presidential vote less than 5.0%. At the other ex-
treme, farmers in nine additional counties joined Plymouth
County farmers in decreasing their Democratic presidential
vote 20.0% or more.
Ethnicity appears to be the more plausible explanation of
1936-1940 voting behavior. An examination of Table IV re-
veals that the 1940 "farm revolt" in Iowa was concentrated in
the population in these farm precincts which actually lived on farms ranged from 82,7% in Ply-
mouth County to 60.7% in Dallas County,
Because the Iowa Official Register reported the precinct vote for only the two major parties
in the 1936 and 1940 elections, while it listed the total vote cast statewide, and in each county,
the figures in the text exaggerate the size of the decrease in Roosevelt's share of the farm vote
compared with the decrease in his proportion of the statewide vote. When the two-party vote is
used to determine Roosevelt's losses among both electorates, his statewide decrease is 8,2%
(rather than 6,8%), compared with 11,3% among fanners.
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TABLE III
Number of Iowa Counties in which the Democratic Percentage of the Farm
Vote for President Decreased Specific Amounts, 1936-1940^
Decrease in Democratic
Farm Vote
0.1 - 4.9% (N=18)
5.0 - 9.9% (N = 32)
10.0 - 14.9% (N=27)
15.0-19.9% (N=12)
20.0 - 24.9% (N=7)
25.0 - 29.9% (N = 2)
30.0-34.9% (N=l)
^Official Register. 1933-1934, 262-268; Official Register, 1937-1938, 224-
311; Official Register. 1941-1942, 560-647.
counties with large numbers of first- and second-generation
German-Americans. In the nine counties with the largest pro-
portions of German foreign stock (24.0-31.9% of the total
population), the decrease in the Democratic percentage of the
farm vote for president was over three times the decrease in
the thirty-nine counties where first- and second-generation
German-Americans were least numerous (less than 8.0% of
the total population). Roosevelt's farm vote fell only 6.1% in
the least-German counties compared with 19.6 % in the most-
German counties."
The data indicates that, at least in Iowa, the widely-
heralded agrarian protest was, in reality, part of a movement
against Roosevelt by voters in areas with significant German-
American populations. There is little evidence of a "farm re-
volt" in Iowa counties with few German-Americans. The role
of German-Americans in the 1940 presidential election can be
' ' Because the census reports the national origins of immigrants and of their children only for
counties, and for cities of at least 10,000 population, no exact data regarding the national origins
of the farm population, as distinct from the entire county population, are available. However, the
evidence suggests strongly that the proportion of farm residents in Iowa counties who were first- or
second-generation German Americans was quite similar to the proportion of all residents of the
same counties who were first- or second-generation German-Americans, with somewhat higher
proportions of German-Americans living on farms than in cities throughout the state. See Table V
for more detailed information regarding the proportions of German-Americans living in Iowa
cities, Iowa rural counties and Iowa urban counties.
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TABLE IV
Decrease in the Democratic Percentage of the Farm Vote for President by
Iowa Counties, 1936-1940, by the German Foreign Stock Percentage of the
Total Population, 1930^
German Foreign Stock Decrease in Democratic Farm
0.1
8.0
16.0
24.0
- 7.9%
- 15.9%
- 23.9%
- 31.9%
Vote for President
6.1% (N = 39)
11.0% (N = 30)
16.4% (N=21)
19.6% (N=9)
^Fifteenth Census. 785-788; Official Register, 1937-1938. 224-311; 1941-
1942. 560-647.
studied further by comparing voting patterns in rural and in
urban German-American areas, as well as voting patterns in
German-Protestant and German-Catholic areas.
Although both rural and urban areas with large numbers
of German-Americans turned against Roosevelt in 1940 to a
greater extent than similar areas with few German-Ameri-
cans, Table V indicates that the relationship between German
ancestry and voting behavior was particularly strong in rural
areas. The Democratic percentage of the presidential vote fell
off more noticeably in rural counties with given proportions of
first- and second-generation German-Americans than in
either urban counties or cities with similar proportions of Ger-
man-Americans. In rural counties where the German foreign
stock was less than 8.0% of the total population, Roosevelt's
vote decreased 4.4%, compared with only 1.7% in urban
counties with similar proportions of German-Americans. At
the other end of the scale, in counties where first- and second-
generation German-Americans were 24.0-31.9% of the total
population, a similar relationship between voting behavior in
rural and in urban counties existed. There, rural counties de-
creased their Democratic presidential vote 17.5%, compared
with only 7.7% in urban counties.
Table V shows a relatively larger concentration of Ger-
man-Americans in rural counties than in either urban
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TABLE V
Decrease in the Democratic Percentage of the Presidential Vote, 1936-1940,
by Iowa Rural Counties, Urban Counties, and Cities,* by German Foreign
Stock Percentage of the Total Population, 1930^
Germa F ' Decrease in Democratic Percentage of Presidential Vote
Stock Rural Counties Urban Counties Cities
0 - 7.9% 4.4% (N = ll) 1.7% (N=5) 2.8% (N = 10)
8.0-15.9% 7.1% (N=8) 4.7% (N=6) 2.5% (N=6)
16.0-23.9% 11.2% (N = 6) 8.7% (N=4) 9.2% (N=5)
24.0-31.9% 17.5% (N = 5) 7.7% (N=l)
*"Rural Counties" had no community over 2,499 population in 1930.
"Urban Counties" had at least one-half of their population in cities of
10,000 and up in 1930.
"Cities" includes all communities of 10,000 and up in 1930. A 10,000 pop-
ulation figure was used for "cities" because the 1930 census lists the country
of birth for the foreign born and for the foreign-born parents of the native
born only for counties and for communities of 10,000 and up. Comparable
information for smaller communities is not available.
The smaller Democratic decrease in "urban counties" than in "cities" re-
flects the fact that the county decreases are based on changes in the total
vote, while the city decreases are of the two-party vote, the only voting data
available for city precincts. When changes in the "urban county" and in the
"city" vote are calculated on the same (two-party) basis, Roosevelt's urban
county losses are larger than those in the cities. The decreases in his share of
the two-party vote in the four categories of urban counties, from the least
German to the most German, respectively, were 3.0%, 6.5%, 12.8%, and
8.8%.
^Fifteenth Census, 785-788; Official Register. 1933-1934. 262-268; 1937-
1938. 224-311; 1941-1942. 560-647.
counties or cities. Three-eighths (36.7%) of rural counties had
a German foreign stock that was at least 16.0% of the total
population, compared with only one-third of urban counties
(31.3%), and one-fourth (23.8%) of cities.
The relationship between community size, German ances-
try, and 1936-1940 voting behavior suggests that the role of
ethnicity in the third Roosevelt election was more complex
than earlier writers realized. Despite Samuel Lubell's asser-
tion that " . . . this German-American swing [away from
Roosevelt was not] merely an agricultural one [because] post-
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election surveys in 1940 . . . showed the same pattern for
German-American precincts in the cities," '^  the Iowa data
indicates that Roosevelt's vote decreased more in rural than in
urban areas with given concentrations of German-Americans.
Lubell supplies no data to support his conclusion, while other
authors who emphasize the role of German-Americans in de-
creasing Roosevelt's vote do not even consider the question of
community size. " The Iowa findings indicate a need to study
other states, in an attempt to determine if community size was
significant elsewhere.
Despite the differences in the 1936-1940 voting behavior of
equally-German rural and urban areas in Iowa, a positive
relationship between the size of the German-American popu-
lation and the size of the decrease in the Democratic presi-
dential vote prevailed in both types of areas. At least in Iowa,
the size of the German-American population was more closely
related to 1936-1940 voting behavior than was the size of the
community, as rural and urban areas with large numbers of
German-Americans moved away from Roosevelt in 1940 more
than rural or urban areas with few German-Americans.
Ethnicity, in the form of German ancestry, appears to have
been more important than size of community.
Interpretations which emphasize ethnicity as a determining
factor in 1936-1940 voting behavior concentrate on German-
Americans. However, they also assert that Italian-Americans,
Irish-Americans, and Roman Catholics in general, joined
German-Americans in giving Roosevelt a significantly smaller
share of their vote than they had four years earlier. '" Of these
additional groups of anti-Roosevelt voters. Catholics are the
most visible and thus the most accessible for an analysis of
"LubeW, Future American, 135.
"Bums, Roosevelt, Lion and Fox, 455; Divine, Foreign Policy, 86; Barnard, Wendell
Willkie. 265.
"Among the writers who attribute much of the decrease in Roosevelt's vote between 1936
and 1940 to Irish-Americans, to Italian-Americans, and to Roman Catholics in general, as well
as to German-Americans, are Gosnell, Champion Campaigner, 187; Moscow, Roosevelt and
Willkie. 197; Lubell, Revolt Moderates, 80; and Otis L. Graham, "The Democratic Party, 1932-
1945," History of U.S. Political Parties, ed. Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., Ill (New York. 1973),
1953.
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1936-1940 voting behavior in Iowa."
Among the groups usually described as responsible for the
decline in the Democratic presidential vote in 1940, Catholics
are second only to German-Americans. Harold F. Gosnell
notes that "Among religious groups, Roosevelt dropped off
most among Catholics;" Warren Moscow concludes that
"Irish Catholic Democrats departed the Democratic Party in
large numbers in 1940;" and Lubell maintains that Roose-
velt's " . . . heaviest losses were among voters of German,
Italian, or Irish ancestry," the latter two overwhelmingly
Catholic, the first somewhat more Protestant than Catholic. "
Although German-Americans are probably more evenly
divided between Catholicism and Protestantism than the
members of any other large national group in the United
States, published accounts of 1936-1940 voting behavior
which emphasize the role of ethnicity fail to mention that
characteristic of German-Americans. Lubell uses "German"
and "Catholic" in such a way as to suggest that the two
groups were almost identical. ' ' This usage overlooks both the
Protestant majority among German-Americans and the
minority status of Germans among American Catholics.
The traditional view that Roman Catholics contributed
more than any other religious group to Roosevelt's losses in
1940 is not supported by an examination of the Iowa vote. As
Table VI demonstrates, the Roosevelt vote in Iowa declined
somewhat more in counties with large numbers of Lutherans
''Although Irish-Americans were relatively numerous in nineteenth century Iowa, they have
always been a far smaller group in the state than German-Americans, and, by 1940, were too few
and too scattered to permit a meaningful analysis of the vote of first- and second-generation
Irish-Americans at the county level. The census of 1930 reported only 47,282 first- or second-
generation Irish-Americans in Iowa, compared with six times as many German-Americans—
287,663,
Italian-Americans and most other southern and eastern European immigrants have never
been numerous in Iowa, In 1930, there was only one furst- or second-generation Italian-American
for every twenty-nine German-Americans, 9,747 compared with 287,663. For an analysis of
1936-1940 Italian-American and Irish-American voting behavior in Philadelphia, see Thomas
G, Ryan, "Ethnicity, Quantification and Voting Behavior" (unpublished paper available from
the author), 13-16.
"•Champion Campaigner. 167; Roosevelt and Willkie. 197; Revolt Moderates. 80, Colman
J. Barry, The Catholic Church and German-Americans (Milwaukee, 1957), 7, notes that over
35% of the German immigrants to the United States between 1865 and 1900 were Catholic.
"LubeW, Future American. 142-144, 148-150.
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TABLE VI
Decrease in Democratic Percentage of Presidential Vote by Iowa Comities,
1936-1940, by Roman Catholic, Lutheran and "German Protestant" Per-
centages of the Total Church Membership in Each County, 1936^
Percentage of Decrease in the Democratic Percentage of the Presidential
All Church Vote in Iowa Counties by Percentage of Church Members in
Members in Each of Three Church Categories i
Iowa Counties
in the Churches
Indicated
0 - 7.9%
8.0 - 15.9%
16.0 - 23.9%
24.0-31.9%
32.0 - 78.8%
Roman
7.1%
8.2%
7.2%
6.3%
8.5%
Catholic
(N=19)
(N=22)
(N = 23)
(N=12)
(N = 23)
Lutheran
4.5%
7.4%
6.5%
8.9%
10.2%
(N = 28)
(N=15)
(N=14)
{N=23)
(N=19)
"German
4.5%
7.0%
8.8%
10.3%
14.5%
Protestant"
(N=35)
(N = 25)
{N = 17)
(N=12)
(N=10)
^United States Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Religious
Bodies: 1936. Volume I, Summary and Detailed Tables (Washington, 1941),
750-754. Volume II, Part 1, Denominations A to J, 614-618, 626-629;
Volume II, Part 2, Denominations K to Z, 872-873, 924-925, 953-958; Offi-
cial Register, 1937-1938, 312-313; Official Register, 1941-1942, 652-653.
(24.0-78.8% of all church members) than in counties with
similar proportions of Catholics, and declined most of all in
counties where equally-large proportions of residents were
members of five Protestant churches which were predomi-
nantly German in background—the Evangelical Church, the
Evangelical and Reformed Church, the United Lutheran
Church, the American Lutheran Church, and the Evangelical
Lutheran Synod of Missouri, Ohio, and Other States. "
In Iowa counties in 1940, nationality and voting behavior
corresponded with each other more closely than religion and
voting behavior. Iowa counties with large numbers of first-
and second-generation German-Americans turned away from
"Because of mergers, particularly among Lutherans, in some cases the names of these
churches no longer represent what they did in the 1936 religious census. These five "German
Protestant" denominations are examples of ethnic churches at the time of the third Roosevelt
election.
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Roosevelt in 1940 regardless of whether the counties were
Protestant or Catholic, Lutheran or Methodist.
Among the German Catholic counties which reduced their
Democratic presidential vote at least 10.0% were Carroll,
Chickasaw, Dubuque, Jackson, and Plymouth. " German
Lutheran counties where Roosevelt's vote fell at least 10.0%
included Bremer, Clayton, Crawford, and Ida. The tendency
of German counties to register large decreases in Democratic
presidential vote, regardless of religious composition, is evi-
dent in such counties as Butler, Franklin, Grundy, Hardin,
Lyon, and O'Brien. In each of these counties, fewer than half
of all church members were in denominations traditionally
associated with German-Americans. In these six German
counties where Methodists, Presbyterians, and other non-Ger-
man denominations predominated, Roosevelt's vote fell as
sharply as in German counties where most church members
were affiliated with traditionally German denominations.
Table VII illustrates the phenomenon of considerably
larger Democratic losses in each class of German counties
than in any group of non-German counties, regardless of the
religious composition of the counties. On the other hand, the
proportion of Roman Catholics-"German Protestants" in
each group of counties was unrelated to 1936-1940 voting be-
havior.
While German counties of varied religious backgrounds
registered above-average Democratic decreases. Catholic
counties with few German-Americans, e.g., Appanoose, John-
son, Monroe, and Palo Alto, reduced their Democratic presi-
dential vote less than the statewide figure of 6.8 %. Table VIII
illustrates both the close relationship between German ances-
try and 1936-1940 voting behavior, and the lack of any mean-
ingful relationship between Roman Catholicism and voting
behavior. As the table indicates, German Catholic counties re-
corded Democratic decreases more than three times as large
as those in Catholic counties with few German-Americans,
12.0% compared with 3.6%.
"Religious Bodies: 1936. I, 750-754; Official Register. 1937-1938. 312-313; anA 1941-1942.
652-653, are the sources for all data regarding the religious composition and the voting behavior
of Iowa counties.
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TABLE VII
Decrease in the Democratic Percentage of the Presidential Vote by Iowa
Counties, 1936-1940, According to the German Foreign Stock Percentage of
the Total Population, 1930, and the Roman Catholic-"German Protestant"
Percentage of Total Church Membership, 1936, in Each CountyS
Roman Catholic- Decrease in the Democratic Percentage of the Presi-
"German Protestant" dential Vote in Iowa Counties by Percentage of the
(RCGP) Percentage German Foreign Stock (GFS) in Each County
of Total Church '
Membership
% RCGP
0 - 24.9%
25.0 - 49.9%
50.0 - 86.7%
0-10.6% GFS 10.7-21.3% GFS 21.4-31.9% GFS
4.7% (N = 32)
5.4% (N = 19)
4.2% (N = 2)
7.8% (N==15)
9.0% (N=14)
17.4% (N=l)
14.4% (N=4)
14.7% (N=12)
^Fifteenth Census. 785-788; Religious Bodies: 1936. I, 750-754; Official
Register. 1937-1938. 312-313; Official Register, 1941-1942. 652-653.
TABLE VIII
Decrease in the Democratic Percentage of the Presidential Vote by Iowa
Counties, 1936-1940, According to the German Foreign Stock Percentage of
the Total Population, 1930, and the Roman Catholic Percentage of the Total
Church Membership in Each County, 1936*>
Roman Catholic (RC) Decrease in the Democratic Percentage of the Presi-
Percentage of All dential Vote in Iowa Counties by the German Foreign
Church Members in Stock (GFS) Percentage of the Total Population
Iowa Counties
0-10.6% GFS 10.7-21.3% GFS 21.4-31.9% GFS
5.0% (N = 36) 7.9% (N=6) 16.9% (N=9)
4.2% (N = 13) 8.7% (N = 16) 13.0% (N=4)
3.6% (N = 4) 8.1% (N=7) 12.0% (N=4)
^Religious Bodies: 1936. I, 750-754; Fifteenth Census. 785-788; Official
Register. 1937-1938. 312-313; 1941-1942. 652-653.
% RC
0 - 19.9%
20.0 - 39.9%
40.0 - 78.8%
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German Lutheran counties voted considerably less Demo-
cratic in 1940 than in 1936, but Lutheran counties with
smaller proportions of first- and second-generation German-
Americans than the statewide figure of 11.2%, recorded
Democratic decreases well below the 6.8% Iowa decrease.
Among these non-German Lutheran counties were Audubon,
where Roosevelt's vote fell only 410%, Humboldt, 5.7%,
Winnebago, 5.1%, and Worth, 4.6%.
Church membership in Iowa corresponded poorly with
1936-1940 voting behavior. The apparent link between mem-
bership in certain denominations, e.g.. Catholic and Luther-
an, and 1936-1940 voting behavior was, in reality, a link be-
tween nationality and voting behavior. Catholic counties and
Lutheran counties which were also German counties de-
creased their Democratic presidential vote more than other
counties. However, when nationality is controlled, it is clear
that German ancestry, rather than religious preference, ex-
plains the above-average Democratic decreases in such
counties. Catholic and Lutheran counties with few German-
Americans reduced their Democratic presidential vote less
than the statewide figure, indicating clearly that nationality is
of more value than religious affiliation in explaining the pat-
tern of Democratic losses in Iowa counties. The data confirms
that German ancestry explains the voting behavior of certain
Catholic and of certain farm areas more satisfactorily than
does religious affiliation or place of residence. At least in
Iowa, German Catholic and German farm areas recorded
above-average Democratic losses in 1940, while Catholic and
farm areas with few German-Americans decreased their
Democratic presidential vote less than the statewide figure.
These findings suggest that interpretations of 1936-1940
voting behavior which emphasize the defection of Roman
Catholics and of farmers from the Roosevelt coalition base
their conclusions upon the voting behavior of German-Ameri-
can Catholic and farm areas. Earlier writers appear to confuse
voting behavior in German Catholic and farm areas with vot-
ing behavior in all Catholic and farm areas, attributing to
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Catholics and to farmers voting behavior which, at least in
Iowa, was unique to German-American Catholic and farm
areas of the state.
II
Determining the motivation of voters is difficult and com-
plex. Nevertheless, analysis of 1936-1940 voting behavior,
combined with other approaches, suggests that World War 11,
rather than the third term or other domestic issues, was the
primary reason for the uneven pattern of Democratic de-
creases in Iowa counties between 1936-1940. However, the im-
pact of the war on voting behavior appears to have been more
complex than was suggested in the preceding discussion,
which emphasized the defection of German-Americans, and
thereby may have implied that the war was a liability to Roose-
velt in 1940.
Although World War II decreased Roosevelt's appeal to
German-Americans, 1940 survey research indicates that, over-
all, foreign policy issues may have aided the president's bid for
reelection, as some Americans voted for him because of the
war, thereby offsetting at least some of the decrease in the
Democratic presidential vote among German-Americans. Two
types of surveys suggest this conclusion. One asked prospec-
tive voters why they preferred Willkie or Roosevelt. The
second asked respondents how they would vote with, and with-
out, the existence of war in Europe.
While the reasons given for preferring Willkie or Roosevelt
may not be definitive answers to questions of voter motiva-
tion, it is noteworthy that prospective Roosevelt voters listed
war in Europe as a reason for preferring Roosevelt far more
often than prospective Willkie voters listed the same war as a
reason for favoring Willkie, or for opposing Roosevelt. In
national opinion polls two of the three most frequently ex-
pressed reasons for supporting Roosevelt concerned foreign
affairs, while only one of the six most frequently expressed
reasons for favoring the Republican challenger concerned
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international issues."
To the extent that prospective voters' declared reasons
for preferring one candidate or the other are reliable guides
to voter motivation, these results appear to suggest the possi-
bility that World War II may have aided, rather than
hindered, Roosevelt in 1940. Similar conclusions emerge from
contemporary presidential preference polls. Two weeks before
the 1940 election, the American Institute of Public Opinion
found Roosevelt leading Willkie 54%-46%. However, these
results were virtually reversed (53%-47%) when the same
sample of prospective voters was asked: "If there were no war
in Europe today, which presidential candidate would you vote
for, Roosevelt or Willkie?"2'
If war in Europe aided, rather than hindered, Roosevelt's
1940 reelection bid, and if German-Americans voted consider-
ably more Republican in 1940 than in 1936 because of the
war, what groups supported Roosevelt because of the war?
The usual answer to this question is that a number of ethnic
groups voted for Roosevelt because of his opposition to Ger-
many, and his indirect aid to groups and nations attacked by
Hitler. However, as is so often true in American political his-
toriography, statements regarding the 1940 voting behavior of
such allegedly pro-Roosevelt groups as Jews, Poles, and Nor-
wegians are offered without evidence that they are based on
analysis of either the 1936 or the 1940 voting behavior of the
groups in question."
The complexity of the role of the war in 1936-1940 voting
behavior is apparent in a study by James McGregor Burns,
who notes that "Pro-German and Italian and anti-British ele-
ments swung sharply against the President, and these were
only partly offset by the Jews, eastern seaboard Yankee inter-
'»"Gallup and Fortune Polls," 133.
^'Daniel Katz. "Public Opinion Polls and the 1940 Election," Public Opinion Quarterly, 5
(March, 1941), 72-73.
"Among the authors who maintain that the war in Europe and the Administration's
foreign policy aided Roosevelt's candidacy among Jews, Poles, and Norwegians are Lubell,
Future American. lil-.LyiheW, Revolt Moderates. 80,Moscovi, Roosevelt and Willkie, 190, 197;
Burns, Roosevelt: The Lion. 454-455; Divine, Foreign Policy, 86; and Donald Bruce Johnson,
The Republican Party and Wendell Willkie (Urbana, 1960) 163.
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nationalists, and national groups such as Poles and Norwe-
gians who could not forget Hitler's occupation of their 'old
country.' " Burns sees the war as both a liability and an asset
to Roosevelt's 1940 bid, ". . . Willkie's raising of the war
issue did cut into Roosevelt's vote." Yet, "Poll after poll
showed that the sharper the crisis, the more the voters clung to
Roosevelt. The emergency situation seemed wholly to counter-
act Willkie's third-term warnings.""
If Burns and other students of the 1940 election are correct
in their belief that because of World War II Roosevelt lost
more votes among some ethnic groups than he gained among
others, and if Gallup is correct in his conclusion that the war
enhanced Roosevelt's standing with the voters, the apparent
incongruity may lie with the supposedly non-ethnic majority,
native born whites of native parentage, many of whose
European origins go back to Great Britain and Northern Ire-
land.
The role of Americans of British descent in the election of
1940 has already been suggested by Lubell who maintains that
". . . our oldest ethnic element, the Yankee descendants of
the original English settlers,"" voted more heavily Demo-
cratic in 1940 than in 1936, thereby increasing Roosevelt's
percentage of the vote in five of the six New England states, at
the same time that the nationwide Democratic presidential
vote declined 6.1%. However, Lubell offers no evidence to
support his conclusion that "Yankee descendants of the ori-
ginal English settlers" accounted for the increased Demo-
cratic presidential vote in New England in 1940. Moreover,
even a brief reference to census da ta" indicates that New Eng-
land's demographic history is much more complex than Lubell
assumes when he implies that the bulk of 1940 New England
voters were "Yankees."
Examination of British-American voting behavior in Iowa
"Burns, Roosevelt: The Lion. 454-455.
"huheW, Future American, 135.
"Fifteenth Census. Ill, Part 1, 355-360, 1027-1031, 1089-1101; Part 2, 164-168, 766-769,
1128-1132.
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can help answer questions about the response of that group to
World War 11. Because British immigrants and their descen-
dants were a large majority of all whites during the first 200
years of American history, they constituted a majority of all
third- and later-generation whites well into the twentieth cen-
tury—59.4% in 1920, 55.3% in 1930, and 51.2% in 1940."
Therefore, the proportion of native whites of native parentage
in counties, cities, and states is a useful index to the size of the
British-American segment of the population at the time of the
third Roosevelt election.
In Iowa counties with the largest proportions of third- and
later generation Americans, and thus of Americans of British
descent, the Democratic presidential vote declined consider-
ably less than in counties with the smallest proportions of resi-
dents whose families had been in the United States for at least
three generations. As Table IX discloses, Roosevelt's vote de-
clined less than half as much (4.8% compared with 10.6%) in
Iowa counties with the largest proportions (80.1%-93.4% of
the total population) of third- and later-generation Americans
as it did in counties with the smallest proportions (39.6%-
53-.0%) of old stock Americans. In the seven counties where
over 90.0% of the population was at least third-generation,
the Democratic presidential vote declined only 2.4%, little
more than one-third the statewide decline of 6.8%, and less
than one-sixth the 16.0% decline in the nine most German
counties. The seven counties and their third-generation popu-
lations were Clarke (91.3%), Davis (92.7%), Decatur
(92.4%), Ringgold (91.3%), Van Buren (90.1%), Warren
(90.4%), and Wayne (93.4%).^'
The 1936-1940 voting behavior of the most British
"For information regarding the relative proportions of British-Americans and of other
European groups in the white population of the United States at various times since 1790, see
"Report of Committee on Linguistic and National Stocks in the Population of the United
States," in Annual Report of the American Historical Association for the Year 1931 (Washing-
ton, 1932), Volume I, 108-124, and U.S. Bureau of the Census, Historical Statistics of the
United States. Colonial Times to 1957 (Washington, 1960), 7, 56-57. U.S. Bureau of the Cen-
sus, unpublished data, for the proportion of British-Americans among native whites of native
parentage in 1920, 1930, and 1940.
"Fifteenth Census. Part 1,
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counties was largely the reverse of that in the most German
counties (Table II). The very different patterns of 1936-1940
voting behavior in the two types of counties are convincing
testimony that World War II was a determining factor in vot-
ing behavior in the Hawkeye state in the Roosevelt-Willkie
contest.
TABLE IX
Decrease in the Democratic Percentage of the Presidential Vote, 1936-1940,
by Iowa Counties, by Native Bom Whites of Native Parentage Percentage of
the Total Population, 1930'
Native Born Whites Decrease in Democratic Percentage
of Native Parentage of the Presidential Vote
39.6 - 53.0%
53.1 - 66.5%
66.6 - 80.0%
80.1 - 93.4%
10.6%
10.1%
5.6%
4.8%
(N = 6)
(N=36)
(N=34)
(N=23)
^Fifteenth Census, Part I, lbl-112\ Official Register, 1937-1938, 312-313;
Official Register, 1941-1942. 652-653.
Although the outbreak of war in Europe and the appar-
ently strong feelings of many Americans toward that war
appear to explain much of the variety in 1936-1940 voting be-
havior, the unsettled state of American politics in the 1930s
could also have contributed to the uneven pattern of Demo-
cratic losses at the end of the decade. Both the landslide pro-
portions of Roosevelt's 1936 victory and the relatively large
amount of ticket-splitting which occurred in that election sug-
gest the possibility that Democratic losses in 1940 may have
been concentrated in traditionally Republican areas, where
large numbers of voters had favored Roosevelt over both
Hoover and Landon without, however, renouncing the Repub-
lican party completely. Voters in these traditionally Republi-
can areas may have returned to the GOP in large numbers in
1940, thereby contributing to both the increase in the Republi-
can presidential vote and to the uneven pattern of Republican
gains in Iowa counties between 1936 and 1940.
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However, this possible explanation of the variety in 1936-
1940 voting behavior in Iowa counties receives no support
from an examination of voting data. In fact. Table X demon-
strates that Iowa counties which were traditionally the most
Republican, and those which were traditionally the least Re-
publican, based on the Republican percentage of the vote for
state auditor in the six elections (1920-1930) preceding the
political upheaval of the Great Depression, registered similar
decreases in their Democratic presidential vote between 1936
and 1940. The two categories of counties which had been the
most Republican in the 1920s recorded Democratic decreases
of 6.8% and 7.3% between 1936 and 1940. The two least Re-
publican groups of counties registered similar Democratic de-
creases, 6.5% and 8.7%. The absence of any marked differ-
ence in the 1936-1940 voting behavior of counties which had
been the most Republican in the state, 1920-1930, and of
counties which had been the least Republican in the same
period, suggests that the traditional (pre-depression) political
allegiance of Iowa counties offers no explanation for the un-
even pattern of decreases in the Democratic presidential vote
between the second and the third Roosevelt elections.
TABLE X
Decrease in the Democratic Percentage of the Presidential Vote, 1936-1940,
by the Traditional (pre-depression) Strength of the Repuhlican Party in Iowa
Comities, hased on Republican Vote for State Auditor, 1920-1930 InclusiveJ
Republican Vote for Decrease in the Democratic
State Auditor. Presidential Vote.
1920-1930 1936-1940
44.3 - 55.6%
55.7 - 67.0%
67.1 - 78.3%
78.4 - 89.5%
6.5%
8.7%
6.8%
7.3%
(N=6)
(N=29)
(N=42)
(N = 22)
¡Official Register. 1921-1922. 461-462; 1923-1924. 497-498; 1925-1926.
542-543; 1927-1928. 460-461; 1929-1930. 426-427; 1931-1932. 440-441.
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The absence of a significant relationship between the size
of the 1936-1940 decrease in the Democratic presidential vote,
and all but two of the other factors which have been examined,
points strongly to several interrelated conclusions regarding
1936-1940 voting behavior in Iowa. First, German immigrants
and their children decreased their Democratic presidential
vote more than any other group in the state. Second, Iowa
voters of British descent reduced their support for Roosevelt
less than other groups of Iowans. Third, although the Demo-
cratic presidential vote decreased somewhat more among
Catholics, farmers, and other non-urban Iowans than it did
among Protestants, non-farmers, or Iowans who lived in more
urban areas, these differences refiected the larger proportions
of Catholics, of farmers, and of other non-urban Iowans who
were of German descent rather than voting behavior which
was unique to Catholics as Catholics, to farmers as farmers, or
to farm and small town residents as ruralites. Although the
Democratic presidential vote fell somewhat more in rural
counties with given proportions of German-Americans than in
either urban counties or in cities with similar percentages of
first- and second-generation Germans, change in voting be-
havior between 1936 and 1940 corresponded more closely with
the size of the German-American population than with the
size of the community. Fourth, and last, traditional (pre-de-
pression) county voting patterns have no explanatory value in
connection with changes in the presidential vote between 1936
and 1940.
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